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NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND BARS:  
THE NEED TO COMBAT CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT OF STATE 
STATUTORY RAPE LAWS 
Meredith Cohen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Before he was convicted and incarcerated, Genarlow Wilson 
was a model teenager.1 He had no criminal record and a 3.2 GPA.2 
He was also a star football player and homecoming king.3 College 
football coaches courted him regularly and offered full tuition 
scholarships.4 Genarlow Wilson was released from prison on 
October 26, 2007, after spending more than two years behind 
bars.5 How did this seemingly ideal teenager end up in prison 
                                                           
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2009; B.A. Washington University in St. 
Louis 2005. 
1 Patrick Gilbert, Waiting For Justice, THE BATTALION VIA U-WIRE, July 
10, 2007. 
2 Leonard Pitts Jr., Georgia’s Twisted Sense of Justice, VIRGINIAN PILOT 
& LEDGER-STAR, Apr. 4, 2007, at B9. 
3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
5 Brenda Goodman, Man Convicted as Teenager in Sex Case is Ordered 
Freed By Georgia Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at A9. The Supreme 
Court of Georgia held: 
the [Superior Court of Monroe County] properly ruled that Wilson’s 
sentence of ten years in prison for having consensual oral sex with a 
fifteen-year-old girl when he was only seventeen years old constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment, but erred in convicting and sentencing 
Wilson for a misdemeanor crime that did not exist when the conduct in 
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instead of sitting at home and debating over which college to 
attend? In December of 2003,6 Wilson and some of his teenage 
friends rented rooms at a motel and had a New Year’s Eve Party.7 
During the party, a fifteen-year-old girl performed oral sex on 
Wilson, who was then seventeen years old.8 Wilson insisted that 
the girl not only willingly performed the act, but in fact, initiated 
the activity.9 Nonetheless, Wilson was charged with aggravated 
child molestation.10 He was offered a plea bargain, but “[h]e could 
not see himself admitting to something he did not do, becoming a 
registered sex offender, having that follow him for the rest of his 
life, and being forbidden even to live in the same house with his 
younger sister.”11 Consequently, Wilson was convicted of 
aggravated child molestation and received a mandatory sentence of 
ten years imprisonment without possibility of parole.12 
                                                           
question occurred. 
Humphrey v. Wilson, 282 Ga. 520 (Ga. 2007). The case was remanded to the 
habeas court for it to reverse Wilson’s conviction and discharge him from 
custody. Id. 
6 Gilbert, supra note 1. 
 7 Wilson v. The State, 279 Ga. App. 459 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Pitts, supra note 2. Wilson characterized the sexual activity between 
himself and the girl as “consensual” or “voluntary.” Wilson, 279 Ga. App. at 
461. 
10 Wilson, 279 Ga. App. at 459. At the time of conviction, the minimum 
sentence was ten years in prison with no possibility of probation or parole and 
the maximum sentence was thirty years in prison. Humphrey, 282 Ga. at 521. 
 11 Pitts, supra note 2. GA. CODE ANN. §42-1-12 (2006) would require 
Wilson to register as a sex offender. Humphrey, 282 Ga. at 521. GA. CODE 
ANN. §42-1-15 (2006) would prevent Wilson from living in the same house as 
his sister because it prohibits convicted sex offenders from living within “1,000 
feet of any child care facility, church, or area where minors congregate.” Id. 
 12 Wilson, 279 Ga. App. at 459. GA. CODE ANN § 16-6-4(a) (2006) 
provides, “[a] person commits the offense of child molestation when he or she 
does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under 
the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either 
the child or the person.” Id. at 460. GA. CODE ANN § 16-6-4(c) (2006), the 
statute under which Wilson was convicted, provides that “[a] person commits 
the offense of aggravated child molestation when such person commits an offense 
of child molestation which act physically injures the child or involves an act of 
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According to his sentence, before his release from prison 
Wilson would have to provide prison officials with information, 
including his residence and his photograph.13 That information, 
along with the nature of his offense, would be forwarded to the 
sheriff’s office14 who would post the content around the county in 
which he lived and on the Internet.15 Further, under Georgia’s 
residency restriction laws, when Wilson was released, he would not 
be able to live or work within 1,000 feet of any child care facility, 
church, or other area where minors congregate.16 
The year after Wilson was sentenced, the Georgia state 
legislature enacted a law that made consensual oral sex between 
adolescents only a misdemeanor punishable by a one year sentence 
with no sex offender registration requirements.17 Thus, if the two 
had instead engaged in sexual intercourse, Wilson’s crime would 
have been a misdemeanor with only a one-year sentence.18 
However, because the legislature decided not to make the law 
retroactive,19 it left Wilson in prison for over two years until the 
                                                           
sodomy.” Id. And under GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-6.1 (2006), aggravated child 
molestation is a “serious violent felony” carrying a mandatory minimum 
sentence of ten years without possibility of parole. Id. 
13 Humphrey, 282 Ga. at 521. 
14 Id. (noting that upon release, Wilson would have had to provide his new 
address, his fingerprints, his social security number, his date of birth, and his 
photograph). 
15 Id. 
16 Id.; see also  Brenda Goodman, Georgia Justices Overturn Curb on Sex 
Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2007, at A26 (noting that although the 
amendment dealing with residency has been overturned by the Georgia Supreme 
Court, the provisions regarding employment and loitering are still in effect). 
 17 Gilbert, supra note 1; see also Humphrey, 282 Ga. at 522. 
 18 Sanford Brickner, Know Your Rights: Punishment For Sexual Activity 
May Sometimes Be Excessive, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Aug. 10, 2007, at D2. 
19 The legislature expressed the intent that “[t]he provisions of this Act 
shall not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which 
occurred prior to the effective date of the Act repealing, repealing and reenacting, 
or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a 
result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment.” H.B. 1059, 148th 
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006). The reasoning behind the law is that  
recidivist sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use physical violence, 
and sexual offenders who prey on children are sexual predators who 
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Georgia Supreme Court ended his sentence.20 
Wilson is not the only teen who has suffered legal 
repercussions for his sexual activity.21 In 1996, Michael Peterson 
became a convicted sex offender in New Hampshire at age nineteen. 
Peterson was arrested and convicted for having sex at a party with 
a fifteen-year-old.22 Although he received a suspended sentence, he 
has had to register as a sex offender for the past eleven years.23 As 
a result of the state law governing sex offenders, Peterson, who is 
now married with children, cannot coach his three children’s teams 
or chaperone their school trips.24 Further, as a carpenter, Peterson 
is not allowed to work at sites near children because of residency 
restrictions.25 Laurie Peterson, Michael’s wife, acknowledges that 
her husband’s behavior at the time was not admirable, but 
nevertheless urged the New Hampshire Legislature to pass a bill 
that would prosecute fewer teenagers for consensual sex.26 The bill 
would also permit some people who were younger than twenty-
one at the time they were arrested for consensual teenage sex acts 
to petition a judge to be removed from the state’s sex offender 
                                                           
present an extreme threat to the public safety. Many sexual offenders are 
extremely likely to use physical violence and to repeat their offenses; 
and some sexual offenders commit many offenses, have many more 
victims than are ever reported, and are prosecuted for only a fraction of 
their crimes . . . [and] this makes the cost of sexual offender 
victimization to society at large, while incalculable, clearly exorbitant. 
Id. 
20 Goodman, supra note 5. The Court noted that the “severe felony 
punishment and sex offender registration imposed on Wilson make no 
measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment.” Id. The decision by 
the Court was not unanimous. The dissenters argued that the decision 
represented a disregard for the legislature’s authority and claimed that “it would 
open the door for other felony offenders convicted of aggravated child molestation 
to be ‘discharged from lawful custody.’” Id. 
21 Wendy Koch, Defining A Sex Predator, For Life, USA TODAY, July 
25, 2007, at 3A. 
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registry.27 Although the bill passed the House, it did not receive 
enough votes in the Senate to become law.28 
There are many individuals throughout the country with stories 
similar to those of Wilson and Peterson.29 In Connecticut, Jeff 
Davis, now twenty-two, was charged with a sex crime when he 
was eighteen years old for engaging in sexual acts with his serious 
girlfriend.30 Davis was a junior in high school when he met the 
fifteen-year-old girl in study hall at school.31 They started out as 
friends, then began to date, and fell in love.32 Davis says that they 
often talked about their plans for the future—how they planned to 
get married, buy a house, and create a life together.33 However, 
when the girl started paying less attention to her schoolwork, her 
father blamed Davis and Davis’s relationship with his daughter, 
and he reported Davis to the Newington police.34 Davis was 
arrested and convicted of second-degree sexual assault, even though 
his girlfriend told investigators that she and Davis were dating and 
                                                           
27 Lauren R. Dorgan, Wife: ‘He’s Not a Predator’, CONCORD MONITOR, 
May 24, 2007, available at http://www.concordmonitor.com/apps/pbcs. 
dll/article?AID=/20070524/REPOSITORY/705240323. Similar laws were 
enacted in Oregon in 2007. See 2007 Or. Laws Ch. 609 (“No sooner than two 
years, but no later than five years, after the termination of juvenile court 
jurisdiction over a person required to report . . . , the person may file a petition 
for relief from the duty to report.”). 
28 Koch, supra note 21. HB 504, which some have called the “Laurie 
Peterson” bill, passed a State House committee 18-0 in March, 2007. Dorgan, 
supra note 27. It cleared a State Senate committee in May, 2007 on a 4–1 vote. 
Id. On May 24, 2007, an amendment was rejected on the State Senate floor and 
the bill was laid on the table. H. 504, 2007 Gen. Court, 116th Sess. (N.H. 
2007). State Senator Joe Foster, who chairs the Senate committee that approved 
the bill, said that he had new concerns about it and thinks it needs more work. 
Dorgan, supra note 27. Other Senators said that they have heard concerns from 
prosecutors and police that the bill does not comply with the Adam Walsh Act, 
a federal law regarding sex offender registration. Id. 
29 Hilda Munoz, A Plan to Redefine Teen Sex Offenders, HARTFORD 
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that she was a willing partner.35 If the age gap between the two 
teenagers had been less than two years, Davis would not have been 
arrested under the state’s second-degree sexual assault statute, 
known in Connecticut as the “Romeo and Juliet” law.36 Although 
he never served time in prison because his sentence was 
suspended,37 Davis is now serving ten years of probation.38 
As a result of his conviction, Davis was forced to register as a 
sex offender,39 which has made moving on with his life quite 
difficult.40 For instance, he has experienced harassment41 and has 
had problems finding work. Davis, who wants to become a 
firefighter, can only find work in warehouses or construction.42 Yet 
even in those areas, his search is often futile and hopeless.43 He 
                                                           
35 Munoz, supra note 29. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. Senior Assistant State’s Attorney Louis Luba, who prosecuted 
Davis’ case, said defense attorneys usually try bargaining for sentences that will 
keep their clients out of prison. Id. He also said that he tries to find a just 
resolution and considers a variety of factors including the age difference, whether 
there was an ongoing relationship that the victim’s parents consented to, and 
whether the younger teen lied about his or her age. Id. 
38 Id. Probation conditions can restrict where a sex offender works and lives 
as well as the people with whom he or she socializes. Munoz, supra note 29. 
The conditions are often different for each offender, but many offenders are ordered 
to attend sex offender treatment and most must have their pictures on the state 
sex offender registry. Id. Davis is not the only teen convicted for having sex in 
Connecticut under the second-degree sexual assault statute. Id. Between 1999 
and February 2007 in Connecticut, teenagers over the age of sixteen were 
convicted of 195 counts of the specific subsection that addresses teen sex. Id. 
The average sentence for each conviction was slightly less than two years spent 
behind bars, in addition to probation and required registration on Connecticut’s 
sex offender registry. Id. 
39 Munoz, supra note 29. He moved in with his uncle in February of 2007, 
and almost immediately after he settled in, police officers arrived at the house 
requesting information for the sex offender registry. Id. They asked for pictures of 
him, his car, and his new home, and also knocked on his neighbors’ doors to 
warn them that a sex offender lived in the neighborhood. Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. On one occasion, someone printed out dozens of copies of Davis’ 
page from the sex offender registry and left them in front of his home. Id. 
42 Munoz, supra note 29. 
43 Id. 
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explains that even in his search for work in warehouses and 
construction, if he is able to get his foot in the door and secure an 
interview, employers almost always cut the interview short when 
they hear about his conviction as a sex offender.44 
These are merely three stories among the myriad of cases in 
which teenagers who engaged in consensual sexual acts with other 
teenagers have been arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and punished. 
The stories of Wilson, Peterson, and Davis elucidate the need to 
reform state statutory rape laws. These men had their lives altered 
because they engaged in activity as teenagers in which more than 
half of teenagers across the country participate.45 However, 
because the law criminalizes their actions, they went from being 
normal teenagers, with hopes of living fulfilling lives and pursuing 
their dreams, to being convicted sex offenders, with 
disappointment and despair clouding their existence. While 
statutory rape laws are absolutely imperative to protect minors 
from sexual predators and “those who would prey upon their 
vulnerability,”46 it is problematic for those same laws to criminalize 
consensual teenage sex47 because the harsh consequences that often 
result from convictions under these laws may lead to cruel and 
unusual punishment.48 
Although some people believe that teenage sex is immoral, the 
public’s view on morality should not be a component in 
determining the scope of the laws.49 As the Supreme Court held in 
Lawrence v. Texas, “[t]he fact that the governing majority in a 
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is 
                                                           
44 Id. 
45 A 1995 study revealed that, by the age of sixteen, 50% of U.S. teenagers 
have had sexual intercourse.  Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex 
With Minors: Defining A Role For Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 703 
(2000). 
46 Id. at 710; see also Munoz, supra note 29 (“Sex offender laws were 
designed to protect people from predators—pedophiles, rapists and the like.”). 
47 This term is used by the author to refer to sexual acts between teenagers 
who are at least 15 years old and with an age difference of four years or less 
between them. 
48 Brickner, supra note 18. 
49 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003). 
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not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the 
practice . . . .”50 Opponents of criminalizing consensual teenage sex 
in statutory rape laws have averred that teenage sex seems to be 
“more of a health or social issue than a crime.”51 Widespread 
reform of statutory rape laws is essential because of the injustices 
endured by then-teenagers such as Wilson, Peterson, and Davis.52 
As many laws stand now, the punishment for consensual 
teenage sex is disproportionate to the crime, and in fact may result 
in cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.53 As such, statutory rape laws should be revised to 
address the problem of harsh consequences that result from 
convictions. Specifically, all states should implement age gap 
provisions in their laws.54 If jurisdictions insist on criminalizing 
acts of consensual teenage sex, the laws should be changed to 
classify the activity as a misdemeanor.55 In addition, the 
punishment for such a misdemeanor conviction should not include 
jail time or sex offender registration, as they constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment for engaging in consensual sexual activity.56 
                                                           
50 Id. at 577. 
51 Munoz, supra note 29. 
52 Maureen Downey, Genarlow Wilson is Free . . . But Other Victim’s of 
Georgia’s Sweeping Sex Offender Laws Are Not, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 
28, 2007, at B6 (“But Wilson is not the only young offender caught in a maze 
of draconian sex laws . . . . Lawmakers must amend the sex offender registry law 
so that it distinguishes between two immature high school kids hooking up at a 
party to a pedophile molesting the toddler next door.”). 
53 See Brickner, supra note 18 (“And while torture, drawing and 
quartering, public dissecting, burning alive and disemboweling have since been 
ruled by courts to be prohibited, in the area of sexual conduct, punishments that 
most would consider cruel and unusual continue to be supported by state 
legislators.”). 
54 As of 2008, only 30 states have age-gap provisions that do not classify 
consensual teenage sex as criminal. See Age of Consent Chart for the US—2008, 
http://www.ageofconsent.us/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2008). 
55 See Koch, supra note 21 (noting that seven states eased punishments for 
teenagers convicted of consensual sex in 2007). 
56 See Gilbert, supra note 1 (classifying Genarlow Wilson’s sentence of ten 
years in prison with required sex offender registration upon release as “harsh” 
and noting that “[t]he Georgia court system must not be familiar with the eighth 
amendment.”). 
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Finally, such laws should be applied retroactively because many of 
the old laws require registration on sex offender registries for life, 
and there may be other individuals who are serving sentences for 
crimes which are no longer felonies.57 
This Note will address the flaws in current state statutory rape 
laws and the legislative remedies needed to prevent the unfairness 
and cruel and unusual punishment already endured by teenagers 
like Genarlow Wilson. Part I will provide a brief history of 
statutory rape laws and the rationales behind the laws. Part II will 
address the current status of consensual teenage sex and statutory 
rape laws. This part will consider whether consensual teenage sex 
is detrimental, the lack of uniform enforcement of sex offense laws, 
and the consequences of a conviction for acts of consensual teenage 
sex. Part III will discuss the Eighth Amendment and what 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. This part will argue that 
all acts of consensual teenage sex should not be legally sanctioned 
and that many state laws lead to cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment. Finally, Part IV will discuss various 
reform ideas that would eradicate the problems caused by the 
current laws while preserving statutory rape laws for cases in 
which there is true sexual coercion or exploitation. 
I. HISTORY OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS 
Statutory rape laws originated in thirteenth century England, 
and were first codified in English law in 1275.58 These early laws 
prohibited sexual relations between adult males and young females 
under the age of twelve.59 In the late sixteenth century, lawmakers 
                                                           
57 See  R. Robin McDonald, Ga. Attorney General to Defend Sex Offender 
Law on Two Legal Fronts, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Aug. 7, 2007, 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1186412330969 (arguing 
that it is unfair that registration laws apply retroactively when sex offense laws 
do not apply retroactively). 
58 Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master’s House: Of Protection, 
Patriarchy and the Potential for Using the Master’s Tools to Reconfigure 
Statutory Rape Law, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 799, 800 (2001). 
59 Daryl J. Olszewski, Statutory Rape in Wisconsin: History, Rationale, 
and The Need For Reform, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 693, 694 (2006). The “initial 
prohibitions . . . restrict[ed] only a male’s sexual relations with young females, 
M. COHEN AUTHORIZED 2.DOC  
726 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
in England lowered the age of consent to ten.60 The laws were 
consistent with other laws in Europe and with other common law 
efforts to protect children from exploitation.61 
The United States adopted England’s statutory rape laws when 
it adopted the English common law,62 and initially did not change 
the age of consent.63 However, in the late nineteenth century, 
“campaigns were launched to increase the age of consent in an 
effort to further protect girls from male sexual aggression.”64 
Accordingly, states increased the age of consent.65 In a further 
attempt to protect young, naïve girls from predators, “[s]ome 
states provided increased penalties for adult men who had sex with 
pre-pubescent girls, and [provided] lesser penalties when the male 
                                                           
and sought to ‘protect a father’s interest in his daughter’s chastity.’” Id. at 694–
95. The apparent reasoning behind the laws was that a non-virgin traditionally 
was not as desirable for marriage, and she was “therefore less likely to bring 
financial reward to her father upon marriage.”  Oberman, supra note 58, at 802. 
Thus, historically, statutory rape laws “aimed to protect the father’s property 
interest in his daughter, and were an embodiment of the legal perception of 
women and girls as ‘special property in need of special protection.’” Id. at 802. 
The states extended legal protection only to virgins, causing statutory rape law 
to serve “as a tool through which to preserve the common morality rather than 
to penalize men for violating the law.” Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into 
Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 8 DePaul J. Health Care 
L. 109, 121 (2004). 
60 Oberman, supra note 59, at 119. 
61 Oberman, supra note 58, at 801. 
62 Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 
63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 403 (1984) (citing Rita Eidson, Comment, The 
Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 UCLA L. REV. 757, 762 (1980)). 
63 Olszewski, supra note 59, at 695.  See also Oberman, supra note 59, at 
119 (“Early American lawmakers set the age of consent at ten.”). 
64 Olszewski, supra note 59, at 695. The campaigns were led by the 
Women’s Christian Temperance Union and various other feminist leaders who 
wanted to protect females from laws and cultural values that threatened their 
health and prosperity and made them subordinate in society. Oberman, supra 
note 58, at 803 (citing Jane E. Larson, Even a Worm Will Turn at Last: Rape 
Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 3–4 
(1997)). 
65 Olszewski, supra note 59, at 695.  Some states raised the age of consent 
as high as twenty-one. Id. However, the average age of consent was sixteen. 
Oberman, supra note 58, at 803. 
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was younger than the female.”66 
In the 1970s, feminists began to express concerns that 
statutory rape laws “perpetuated offensive gender stereotypes and 
restricted the sexual autonomy of young women.”67 The reformers 
“saw sexuality as a vehicle of power that in complex ways kept 
women subordinated in society . . . .”68 The feminists called for 
reforms to “make the laws gender neutral and thus remove the 
implication that only females are inherently vulnerable.”69 
Notably, while feminists called for reform of the statutory rape 
laws, they did not call for their complete abolition because they 
understood the importance of the laws in protecting young people 
from sexual coercion and exploitation.70 As Professor Fran Olsen 
noted: 
On the one hand, [statutory rape laws] protect females; . . . 
statutory rape laws are a statement of social disapproval of 
certain forms of exploitation . . . . On the other hand, 
statutory rape laws restrict the sexual activity of young 
women and reinforce the double standard of sexual 
morality.71 
These concerns show that there is a tension between the impulses 
underlying statutory rape laws.72 Despite this tension, states have 
continued to enforce statutory rape laws. 73 
Today, while chastity concerns are no longer as prominent, 
states provide various other reasons to justify statutory rape laws. 
For instance, these laws are said to protect young people from 
                                                           
66 Oberman, supra note 59, at 119. 
67 Oberman, supra note 58, at 807. 
68 Id. at 803. 
69 Olszewski, supra note 59, at 695. 
70 Id. (“However, rather than seeking the abolition of statutory rape laws, 
those feminists generally called for reforms to make the laws gender neutral and 
thus remove the implication that only females are inherently vulnerable, but 
rather all juveniles are in need of protection.”). 
71 Oberman, supra note 58, at 807. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 809 (“[T]hese vestiges of concern over securing male control over 
girls’ sexuality and protecting girls from harm are overshadowed by . . . 
powerful new functions driving the enforcement of statutory rape laws.”). 
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coerced sexual activity,74 enforce morality,75 prevent teenage 
pregnancy,76 and reduce welfare dependence.77 Although states 
may see these as valid reasons for enforcing statutory rape laws, 
the goals these rationales aim to achieve can still be reached with 
revised laws.78 
                                                           
74 Olszewski, supra note 59, at 698–99. This reason is most often cited as 
a rationale for enforcing statutory rape laws because lawmakers think that the 
power disparity in a relationship between a child and an adult means that the 
child will be unable to resist the adult’s coercive influence. Id. (citing Oberman, 
supra note 45, at 757).  Proponents of this rationale also argue that a teenager is 
incapable of meaningful consent and therefore any sexual conduct is 
nonconsensual and that a person who engages in sexual conduct with a teenager 
takes advantage of the teenager’s vulnerability.  Id. 
75 Olszewski, supra note 59, at 699. “Some people believe that any sexual 
conduct outside of marriage is inherently immoral.  Juveniles, in nearly every 
situation, are prohibited from marrying and thus all sexual activity involving 
juveniles can be seen as immoral.” Id. 
76 Id. Some people argue that prohibitions on sexual activities other than 
sexual intercourse are necessary because they may lead to sexual intercourse, and 
prohibitions on sexual intercourse that do not result in pregnancy are appropriate 
because there is an inherent risk of pregnancy. Id. at 700. In the 1990s, studies 
indicated that adult men were the fathers of a high number of babies born to 
teenage mothers, and this fact created concern because girls who have babies as 
teenagers are less likely to be productive members of societythey are “less 
likely to complete high school, less likely to marry, less likely to be able to 
support their families, and more likely to require public assistance at various 
points in their lives.” Oberman, supra note 58, at 808–09. 
77 Olszewski, supra note 59, at 699–700. In The Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”), Congress concluded 
that the rise of teenage pregnancies is severe and linked to predatory sexual 
practices, and that an effective strategy to combat teenage pregnancy is 
enforcement of statutory rape laws.  Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 
(1996). 
78 Olszewski, supra note 59, at 700–01. 
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II. THE STATUS OF CONSENSUAL TEENAGE SEX AND STATUTORY 
RAPE LAWS 
A. Consensual Teenage Sex—Is it Really So Detrimental? 
Consensual teenage sex in the United States is astoundingly 
common.79 A 1995 study revealed that, by the age of sixteen, 50% 
of U.S. teenagers have had sexual intercourse.80 Another study 
shows that in the U.S., about 60% of unmarried eighteen-year-olds 
are sexually active.81 In fact, it is estimated that there are more than 
7 million incidents of statutory rape every year.82 However, it is 
clear that most incidents are not prosecuted and do not lead to 
arrests and convictions.83 
Even though “rates of sexual intercourse are higher today than 
they were forty years ago, there is little reason to believe that the 
high rates of adolescent sexual activity reflect a new trend.”84 
Instead, for many years, a large number of teenagers have engaged 
in sexual activity which is technically illicit, likely unaware of the 
illegality of their actions, and the criminal justice system has turned 
a blind eye.85 Prior to the 1990s, statutory rape laws were rarely 
enforced and often ignored.86 In the last years of the twentieth 
century, studies revealed that a majority of teen pregnancies were 
the result of sexual relations with adult men.87 As a result, interest 
                                                           
79 See Oberman, supra note 45, at 703. 
80 See id. 
81 Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation of 
Statutory Rape Laws, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 322 (1997). 
82 Oberman, supra note 45, at 703–04. Because the current age of consent 
under most state statutes is sixteen or older, “each incident of sexual intercourse 
among that population is illiciteach constitutes a separate instance of statutory 
rape.” Id. 
83 See id. at 704 (“For any number of reasons, it would be unimaginable to 
attempt to prosecute every instance of sexual contact with minors.”). 
84 Id. at 704. 
85 Id. 
86 Oberman, supra note 58, at 808. 
87 Oberman, supra note 45, at 705. 
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in statutory rape legislation was reignited,88 and both federal and 
state governments created policies encouraging the prosecution of 
statutory rape.89 However, statutory rape laws should not be 
universally applied to all cases of teenage sexual activity because 
adolescent sexual activity is not inherently problematic.90 
In fact, there is ample support for the position that adolescent 
sexual activity may actually be beneficial.91 “[L]iterature on 
adolescent sexuality suggests that adolescent sex can play a 
positive role in young people’s lives, both through the nature of 
the sexual experience itself, and through the potential for the 
experience to serve as a growth tool.”92 Researchers have argued 
that adolescent sexual experimentation “is one way in today’s 
society for young people to gain a sense of independence from 
parents, to begin the process of growing up and taking on adult 
roles.”93 These positive aspects of adolescent sexuality support the 
argument that adolescent sexual activity as a whole is not per se 
detrimental.94 
Despite these arguments that sexual activity may be beneficial 
to young people, the issue of consent is a point of contention 
among supporters of existing statutory rape laws because many 
people believe that adolescents do not have the capacity to 
consent.95 However, there are many adults that might also fall into 
this category, “and the decision to treat intercourse as distinctive in 
this way may simply represent a revival of the old view that 
                                                           
88 Id. 
89 Oberman, supra note 58, at 809. 
90 Kitrosser, supra note 81, at 322–23. 
91 Id. 
92 Kitrosser, supra note 81, at 322. Some have suggested that adolescent 
sex may adequately “prepare an adolescent to deal with future relationships.” Id. 
93 Id. at 323 (quoting SUSAN MOORE & DOREEN ROSENTHAL, SEXUALITY 
IN ADOLESCENCE 65 (1993)). 
94 Id. at 323. 
95 Sherry F. Colb, A Ten Year Sentence for Marcus Dwayne Dixon: The 
Pros and Cons of Statutory Rape Laws, FINDLAW’S WRIT, Feb. 11, 2004, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20040211.html. (“[A]t some level, we might 
have doubts about the competence of a minor to ‘consent,’ in a meaningful way, 
to sexual activity. Because of her youth, the minor might not fully appreciate the 
full physical and emotional implications of her decision.”). 
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‘maidens should be protected from the corruption of their 
virtue.’”96 Also, recent studies show that adolescents often “make 
meaningful choices through rational thinking about possible social 
behaviors.”97 In fact, studies from the 1970s and 1980s show that 
“fourteen-year-olds demonstrate adult levels of competency on 
various measures when making decisions about medical treatment, 
and that fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds generally have a great 
capacity for abstract and ideological political thought.”98 Further, 
and significantly, “[t]his reasoning capability often extends to 
decision-making about sexual activity.”99 Overall, it is too 
simplistic to propose that adolescents typically cannot make 
reasoned decisions regarding consensual sexual activity in all 
instances.100 
However, even in the face of this evidence, many members of 
the government and society still believe that statutory rape laws 
are necessary to regulate adolescent sexual activity.101 Due to the 
recent concerns regarding teen pregnancy, there has been a 
noticeable governmental effort to “reinvigorate the enforcement of 
statutory rape laws.”102 This push has led lawmakers to consider 
whether the criminal law should regulate adolescent sexual behavior 
                                                           
96 Id. 
97 Lewis Bossing, Now Sixteen Could Get You Life: Statutory Rape, 
Meaningful Consent, and the Implications for Federal Sentence Enhancement, 
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1205, 1227 (1998). 
98 Id. at 1227–28. 
99 Id. at 1228. Other studies and evidence also show that many teenagers 
make voluntary choices to engage in sexual activity. Id. at 1228–29 (citing 
GAIL ELIZABETH WYATT ET AL., SEXUAL ABUSE AND CONSENSUAL SEX 23 
(1993)). 
100 Kitrosser, supra note 81, at 289 (“[T]o place all sexual activity in 
certain age-based categories under the statutory umbrella of ‘assault’ or ‘rape’ 
misses the real issue, because it fails to isolate, name, and target those instances 
of sex that are coercive and that should, for that reason, be subject to criminal 
punishment.”). 
101 See, e.g., Koch, supra note 21 (noting that Senator Eric Johnson, a 
Republican in Georgia, believes Genarlow Wilson was fairly punished); see also 
Munoz, supra note 29 (stating that Rep. Arthur O’Neill, a Republican in 
Kansas, agreed that current laws “have resulted in gut-wrenching stories,” but 
the legislature should not change the law so these teenagers do not get arrested). 
102 Oberman, supra note 45, at 706. 
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and if so, how the law can regulate such behavior.103 When 
considering the relationship between the criminal law and 
adolescent sexual behavior, lawmakers should bear in mind that 
“the laws also shape attitudes and are, in turn, shaped by 
prevailing social mores.”104 Laws which are “too out of step with 
current thinking” are less likely to be obeyed or to significantly 
influence whether teenagers decide to engage in sexual activity.105 
The prevailing modern view among lawmakers, judges, attorneys, 
scholars, and members of society is that adolescent sexual behavior 
is not completely destructive and should not be punished as a 
serious criminal offense.106 
B. Lack of Uniform Enforcement 
Another issue with applying statutory rape laws to consensual 
teenage sex is that the laws are not currently enforced uniformly 
throughout the states and even within the states.107 For example, in 
the same courthouse where Genarlow Wilson was fighting for his 
innocence in his trial, a twenty-seven-year-old teacher was 
convicted for having sex with a seventeen-year-old student, which 
is the type of crime statutory rape laws are intended to prevent.108 
However, in contrast to Wilson’s ten year sentence, the teacher 
received just three years’ probation and 90 days in jail.109 Similarly, 
Wendy Whitaker, a woman in Georgia who had been convicted for 
the same crime as Wilson when she was seventeen, was convicted 
for engaging in consensual oral sex with a fifteen-year-old classmate 
                                                           
103 Id. 
104 Kitrosser, supra note 81, at 326 (quoting SUSAN MOORE & DOREEN 
ROSENTHAL, SEXUALITY IN ADOLESCENCE 77–78 (1993)). 
105 Id. 
106 See Kitrosser, supra note 81 (arguing that the laws should focus on the 
destructive norms of adolescent sexuality rather than adolescent sexuality as a 
whole); Gilbert, supra note 1 (noting that Judge Thomas Wilson said that the 
fact that Genarlow Wilson was sentenced to spend ten years in prison was a 
“grave miscarriage of justice”). 
107 See Oberman, supra note 45, at 706 (noting that statutory rape laws are 
currently “being selectively enforced in the absence of any coherent rationale”). 
108 Pitts, supra note 2. 
109 Id. 
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while on school property, but her sentence was for five years of 
probation.110 This lack of uniformity in enforcement of the current 
laws is problematic because innocent teenagers may be subject to 
harsh treatment due to poor displays of prosecutorial discretion.111 
There are various reasons why states selectively enforce the 
laws.112 Regardless of their rationales, this Note argues that such 
selective enforcement is unreasonable, because it makes it difficult 
for teenagers to know the scope of the laws. 
C. Consequences of Conviction for Acts of Consensual 
Teenage Sex 
1. Strong Labels and Classifications 
Just as the enforcement of statutory rape laws differs among 
states, so too does the label for the crime that is attached to acts of 
consensual teenage sex.113 In Georgia, an act of consensual teenage 
sex may be prosecuted as statutory rape, child molestation, or 
aggravated child molestation depending on certain factors.114 In 
                                                           
110 McDonald, supra note 57. Wendy Whitaker pleaded guilty to sodomy 
and was sentenced to five years probation. Id. 
111 See Colb, supra note 95 (“A remaining concern is the worry about 
racism specifically, and discrimination more generally, that arises whenever 
officials are vested with a large amount of discretion.”). 
112 Oberman, supra note 45, at 735 (noting that states choose certain cases 
to prosecute in pursuit of their fiscal self-interest); see also Pitts, supra note 2 
(“[T]here are major disparities in the treatment of black kids and white ones 
facing Georgia justice . . . . [T]he [27 year old] teacher who got off with a wrist 
slap [for having sex with a 17 year old student] was—big surprise—white.”). 
113 See Act of Apr. 26, 2006, secs. 10–11, 2006 Ga. Laws 571 (codified as 
amended at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-3, 16-6-4 (2007) (teenage sex may be 
prosecuted as statutory rape, child molestation, or aggravated child molestation); 
Munoz, supra note 29 (teenage sex may be prosecuted as sexual assault). 
114 GA CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-3, 16-6-4 (2007). A person commits the offense 
of statutory rape when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with anyone under 
the age of 16 who is not his or her spouse. §16-6-3. A person commits the 
offense of child molestation when he or she does any immoral or indecent act to 
or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent 
to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of themselves or the child. § 16-6-4. A 
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other states, such as Wisconsin, consensual teenage sex may be 
prosecuted as sexual assault.115 In Massachusetts, a person may be 
prosecuted for rape if the other individual is less than sixteen years 
old.116 These labels are accompanied by stigma that can cause 
immense psychological damage to teenagers who engage in 
consensual teenage sex, and such disgrace is an additional 
punishment which is not proportional to the crime.117 
2. Lack of Retroactivity 
Many states have revised their laws to include age-gap 
provisions118 and to classify statutory rape as a misdemeanor.119 
                                                           
person commits the offense of aggravated child molestation when he or she 
commits an offense of child molestation which physically injures the child or 
involves sodomy. § 16-6-4. 
115 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.02(2) (West 2007) (“Second degree sexual 
assault. Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has 
not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony.”). 
116 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 23 (2007) (“Whoever unlawfully has 
sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse, and abuses a child under 
sixteen years of age shall, for the first offense, be punished by imprisonment in 
the state prison . . . .”). 
117 Laurie Peterson, A Lifetime of Shame for Consensual Sex, 
MORALOUTGAGE.NET, July 27, 2007, http://www.moraloutrage.net/article. 
php?story=20070727101752747. 
118 Age-gap provisions provide that sexual conduct involving persons who 
are close in age is either not criminal or punished at a lower level. See 
Olszewski, supra note 59, at 706. 
119 Olszewski, supra note 59, at 706. The states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE 
§ 13A-6-62(a)(1) (2007); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.434(a), 11.41.436(a), 
11.41.438(a), 11.41.440(a)(1) (2008); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1407F (2007); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-110(a)(2)(B), 5-14-
125(5)(B)(i), 5-14-126(2)(B), 5-14-127(a) (2008); California, CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 261.5 (2008); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402(1)(d) (West 
2008); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-70(a)(2), 53a-71(a)(1) (2008); 
Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 770(a)(2), 771(a)(1), 772(a)(2)g, 
773(a)(5) (2008); Washington D.C., D.C. CODE §§ 22-3008, 22-3009 (2008); 
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.05(1) (West 2008); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-6-3(b) (2007); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-730(1)(c)(i), 707-
732(1)(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2007); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1508A(1) 
(2008); Illinois, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-14.1(2)(c) (West 2007); 
  
 NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND BARS 735 
For example, Georgia amended its law to provide that if the victim 
is at least fourteen but less than sixteen years old and the person 
convicted of statutory rape is eighteen years old or younger and is 
no more than four years older than the victim, the person will be 
guilty of a misdemeanor, rather than felony statutory rape.120 
While these amendments and revisions reducing convictions for 
consensual teenage sexual acts are a step in the right direction, the 
laws still leave many people either in prison or forced to register as 
sex offenders if they were convicted and sentenced before the laws 
took effect. 
                                                           
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-9 (LexisNexis 2008); Iowa, IOWA CODE 
ANN. §§ 709.4(2)(c), 709.12(4) (West 2008); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 510.050(1)(a), 510.060(1)(b), 510.130(1)(b) (Lexis Nexis 2007); Louisiana, 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.1(A) (West 2007); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 254, 255-A, 260 (2007); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. LAW §§ 3-304(a)(3), 3-306(a)(3), 3-307(a)(3)-(5), 3-308(a) (Lexis Nexis 
2007); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.520e(1)(a) (West 2008); 
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.342-345 (West 2008); Mississippi, 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65(1) (2007); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 
566.034, 566.064 (West 2007); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502(3), 
(5)(b), 45-5-503(3)(a) (2007); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-320.01(1) 
(2007); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.368, 200.364 3.(b) 
(LexisNexis 2007); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:4 (I) 
(2008); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2007); New Mexico, 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(F) (LexisNexis 2008); New York, N.Y. PENAL 
LAW §§ 130.25, 130.30, 130.35, 130.40, 130.45, 130.50 (McKinney 2008); 
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2(a)(1), 14-27.4(a)(1), 14-27.7A 
(2007); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-03, 12.1-20-07 (2007); 
Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (LexisNexis 2008); Oklahoma, OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1112 (West 2007); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 163.345 
(2007); Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3122.1, 3126(a)(8) (West 
2007); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-6 (2007); South Dakota, S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7 (2007); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
506(a) (2007); Texas, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.11(b), 22.011(d) (Vernon 
2007); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-401(3), 76-5-401.1(2), 76-5-402.2(2) 
(2007); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-63 (2007); Washington, WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 9A.44.073(1), 9A.44.076(1), 9A.44.079(1), 9A.44.083(1), 
9A.44.086(1), 9A.44.089(1) (West 2008); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 61-8B-3(a)(2), 61-8B-5(a)(2), 61-8B-7(a)(3), 61-8B-9(b) (LexisNexis 2008); 
Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-303(a)(v), 6-2-304(a)(i) (2008). 
120 Act of Apr. 26, 2006, sec. 10, 2006 Ga. Laws 571 (codified as amended 
at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3 (2007)). 
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This is especially unfair in light of the fact that other laws, 
including laws relating to sex offenses, are applied retroactively.121 
For example, in Georgia, a 2006 amendment “retroactively bar[red] 
anyone on the state’s sex offender registry from living, working or 
loitering within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop or church.”122 As a 
result of the amendment, people who were in compliance with the 
law had to completely uproot themselves and their families.123 
While the Georgia Supreme Court struck down the law in 
November of 2007,124 legislators noted that they would likely 
amend the statute and reintroduce the legislation in January.125 
Legislators are unable to justify the retroactive application of laws 
that provide for further punishment for sex offenders who have 
already served their sentence in light of the fact that the current 
statutes for “sex offenders”—including teenagers who engage in 
consensual sex—provide for less severe penalties which may not 
include sex offender registration. 
                                                           
121 See McDonald, supra note 57. In Florida, a sex offender whose victim is 
under eighteen years old cannot live where children congregate or within 1,000 
feet of schools, parks, playgrounds, and public school bus stops. FLA. STAT. 
§947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2007). In California, voters passed Proposition 83 in 2006, 
which prohibits any registered sex offender from living within 2,000 feet of any 
school, daycare facility, or place where children gather. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US 112 (2007). The law 
applies to all registered sex offenders. Id. 
122 McDonald, supra note 57. 
123 Id. 
124 Goodman, supra note 16. 
125 Id. Notably, the ruling only applies to the residency restrictions of the 
law. The provisions that bar sex offenders from working or loitering in places 
where children gather are still in effect. Id. In fact, in January of 2008, Georgia 
legislators introduced HB 908, in order 
to repeal certain provisions relating to residency and employment 
restrictions for certain sexual offenders; to provide for restrictions on 
where sexual offenders and sexually dangerous predators may reside, 
work, volunteer, or loiter; to provide for a definition; to provide for 
punishment; to provide for exemptions from certain residency and 
employment restrictions; to provide for civil causes of action; to 
provide for applicability; to provide for related matters; to repeal 
conflicting laws; and for other purposes. 
H.B. 908, 149th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2008). 
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3.  Sex Offender Registration Requirements 
Teenagers who are convicted of sexual assault, child 
molestation, or statutory rape must register as sex offenders under 
both state law126 (in states where the offenses were and are still 
felonies) and federal law.127 The Adam Walsh Act, which became 
effective on July 27, 2006, requires each jurisdiction to maintain a 
jurisdiction-wide sex offender registry conforming to the 
requirements laid out in the Act.128 Although there is a provision 
for consensual teenage sex,129 the law applies retroactively.130 
Therefore, those people who were convicted before 2006 must 
continue to register according to the requirements.131 Under the 
Act, a teenager convicted of any sex offense132 will remain on the 
                                                           
126 Koch, supra note 21 (noting that Matthew Shettles, a teenager convicted 
for having sex with his high school girlfriend when he was 18 and she was 
weeks away from turning 15, “has had to register in Oregon whenever he 
moved, got a new job, or made other life changes”); Munoz, supra note 29 
(noting that in Connecticut, Jeff Davis is forced to provide information on the 
state’s sex offender registry). 
127 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 2. 
128 42 U.S.C.A. § 16912 (West 2007). States will probably adhere to the 
provisions of the Act, because it compels them to “either dramatically increase 
their registration and community restrictions or lose federal law enforcement 
grant money.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 12. Another 
significant fact is that federal law is only a floor, and states may increase their 
registration and notification requirements if they chose to do so. Id. 
129 42 U.S.C.A. § 16911(5)(C) (West 2007) (“An offense involving 
consensual sexual conduct is not a sex offense for the purposes of this subchapter 
if the victim was an adult . . . or if the victim was at least 13 years old and the 
offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim.”). 
130 Maggie Jones, How Can You Distinguish a Budding Pedophile From a 
Kid With Real Boundary Problems, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2007, at A1. 
131 Id. 
132 “Sex offense” is defined as  
(i) a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or 
sexual contact with another; (ii) a criminal offense that is a specified 
offense against a minor; (iii) a Federal offense . . . (iv) a military 
offense . . . ; or (v) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense 
described in clauses (i) through (iv).  
42 U.S.C.A. §16911(5)(A) (West 2007). 
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national registry for life, and will have to register with authorities 
every three months, every six months, or every year, depending on 
the classification of the crime.133 Jurisdictions are instructed to 
make all the information readily accessible on the Internet,134 and in 
order to be in compliance with the law to receive federal funding, 
they must provide extensive information.135 This Note argues that 
these requirements are extremely burdensome and constitute an 
additional, unreasonable punishment for teenagers who engage in 
consensual sex. 
Currently, at least twenty-nine states require individuals to 
register as sex offenders for engaging in consensual teenage sex.136 
                                                           
133 Jones, supra note 130, at A1.  
Tier III registrants are those who committed a sex crime punishable by 
more than one year in prison and comparable or more severe than 
aggravated sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact with a child under 13, 
kidnapping of a child by someone other than the guardian, any sex 
crime occurring after the offender was a Tier II offender or an attempt or 
conspiracy to commit such an offense. Tier II registrants are those who 
are not a Tier III offender and whose offense is against a minor, is 
punishable by imprisonment of more than one year, and is comparable 
to or more severe than sex trafficking, coercion and enticement, 
transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, abusive 
sexual contact, involves the use of a minor in a sexual performance . . . 
or if the sex offense occurs after the offender becomes a Tier I sex 
offender. A Tier I sex offender is defined as a sex offender other than a 
Tier II or Tier III sex offender. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 16911(2)-(4) (West 2007) 
134 42 U.S.C.A. § 16918 (West 2007). 
135 42 U.S.C.A. § 16914 (West 2007). This section requires the offender to 
provide his or her name, social security number, address of each residence at 
which he or she will reside, the name and address of any place where the offender 
is or will be an employee, the name and address of any place where the offender 
is or will be a student, and the license plate number and a description of any 
vehicle owned or operated. Id. The section also requires the jurisdiction to 
provide a physical description of the offender, the text of the provision of law 
defining the criminal offense for which the offender is registered, the criminal 
history of the offender, a current photograph of the offender, a set of fingerprints 
and palm prints, a DNA sample, and a photocopy of a valid driver’s license or 
identification card. Id. 
136 The states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-63, 13A-11-200 (2008); 
Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.434, 12.63.010 (2008); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. 
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Further, in eleven states, there are no “Romeo and Juliet 
exceptions” for consensual teenage sex.137 Thus, in those states, 
any teenager who has sex with a person below the age of consent 
could be convicted and required to register as a sex offender, 
regardless of whether it was consensual.138 
Proponents of community notification argue that sex offender 
registries make people feel protected by having knowledge which 
purportedly will equip them to take more safety precautions.139 In 
fact, the original policy underlying the need for registries was 
concern for public safety. In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court 
explained that sex offender registration was not intended as an 
additional punishment for someone convicted of a sexual offense, 
                                                           
STAT. §13-1405 (2007); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-903, 5-14-110 
(2007); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-22-03, 18-3-402 (2007); 
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-250, 54-251, 53a-70 (2008); Florida, 
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.21, 794.011 (2008); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 11-
8-8-7, 11-8-8-5 (2008); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:542, 15: 541, 
14:92(A)(7) (2007); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11222, 11203 
(2007) ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 254 (2007); Maryland, MD. CRIM. 
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-704, 11-701, 3-308 (2007); Massachusetts, MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 178C, 178D (2008), MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 
35A (2008); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §§ 28.723, 28.722, 
750.520e (2008); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 243.166, Subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii), 
609.345 (2008); Missouri, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 589.400, 566.032 (2007).; New 
Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651-B:1, 651-B:2, 632-A:2 (2008); 
New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:14-2, 2C:7-2, 2C:14-3b (2007); North 
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.7, 14-208.6, 14-27.7A (2007); North 
Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-32-15, 12.1-20-07 (2007); Oklahoma, 
OKLA. ST. tit. 57 § 582 (2007), OKL. ST. tit. 21 § 1123 (2007); Rhode Island, 
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.1-3, 11-37.1-2; South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 
23-3-430, § 16-3-655; South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-2, 22-
24B-1, 22-22-7 (2007); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-202, 40-39-
203, 39-13-506 (2007); Texas, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 62.002, 62.001 
(2007); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-27-21.5, 76-5-401, 76-5-401.2 (2007); 
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.130, 9A.44.096 (2008); West 
Virginia, W.VA. CODE §§ 15-12-2, 61-8B-9 (2008); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. 
§301.45, §948.02 (2007). HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 39–40, 
n.110. 
137 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 73. 
138 Id. 
139 Jones, supra note 130. 
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but rather as a civil regulation imposed for the narrowly defined 
interest in protecting the public safety.140 
However, “proponents of these laws are not able to point to 
convincing evidence of public safety gains from them.”141 In a 
recent report on sex offender laws in the United States, Human 
Rights Watch has reported that there “is little public safety 
purpose served by imposing registration requirements on those 
who pose a minimal risk to the community.”142 There are no 
persuasive arguments for why these teenagers should be forced to 
register because there are no public safety gains, yet there are harsh 
consequences for those teenagers who are placed on the registries 
for engaging in acts of consensual sex. 
For individuals convicted of a sex offense for engaging in 
consensual teenage sexual acts, the registration requirements are 
another form of punishment with grave repercussions.143 One 
consequence of community notification is that as these teenagers 
become adults, “they may struggle to stay in the mainstream 
because they have a hard time finding and holding jobs.”144 Not 
only do they have difficulty finding jobs in the professional arena, 
but the prospect of securing a job at any business that performs 
background checks is bleak.145 Thus, convictions for sexual 
offenses “equate directly with job loss and [loss of] employment 
opportunities, . . . and a general inability to provide for a future 
family through gainful employment and parental involvement 
(volunteering, coaching, and chaperoning) in the lives of future 
                                                           
140 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
141 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 3. 
142 Id. at 46. 
143 See Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in 
Sex Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 369–70 (2006) (“In the 
case of the strict liability offender, who has never been judged dangerous to the 
community and who has never had the opportunity to meaningfully contest 
inclusion in the registry, the punitive impact outweighs the civil nonpunitive 
purpose of the registration statute.”). 
144 Jones, supra note 130; see also Munoz, supra note 29 (Defense attorney 
Fanol Bojka said “I’ve seen one too many kids lose their futures because of 
these [probation and registration] conditions. You label a kid a sex offender at 18 
and you’ve limited what the kid can do with his life.”). 
145 Jones, supra note 130. 
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children.”146 
In addition to these difficulties that registered sex offenders 
might experience, they might also be subject to legal residency 
restrictions.147 States and municipalities have increasingly been 
passing laws “that expressly forbid [registered sex offenders] from 
living near places where children gather.”148 Approximately 400 
municipalities across the country have enacted local zoning 
ordinances restricting where sex offenders can live.149 Georgia is 
one state that has applied residency restrictions. Ironically, the 
Attorney General who argued that the state’s “Romeo and Juliet” 
provision should not be applied retroactively simultaneously 
argued that the Legislature should retroactively bar “anyone on the 
state’s sex offender registry from living, working or loitering within 
1,000 feet of a school bus stop or church.”150  
Representatives in Georgia have not been shy about the reasons 
behind these laws. Georgia State House Majority Leader Jerry 
Keen, co-sponsor of the bill providing for residency restrictions, 
stated, “[m]y intent personally is to make it so onerous on those 
that are convicted of these offenses . . . they will want to move to 
another state.”151 Although part of the law has been struck down 
by the Georgia Supreme Court, legislators intend to redraft the law 
and continue implementing residency restrictions.152 As a result of 
                                                           
146 Peterson, supra note 117. In a recent report on sex offender registration, 
Human Rights Watch found that “private employers are reluctant to hire sex 
offenders even if their offense has no bearing on the nature of the job.” HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 81. “Those who tell prospective employers 
that they are registered sex offenders cannot get hired, and those who do not tell 
their employers are eventually fired if and when employers find out.” Id. 
147 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 100. (“At least 20 states 
have enacted laws that prohibit certain sex offenders from living within specified 
distances of places where children congregate.”). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 114. As of September 2007, at least twenty states had enacted 
laws that restrict where registered sex offenders may live. See id. at 100. 
150 McDonald, supra note 57. 
151 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 100 (citing Dick Pettys, 
Republicans Unveil First Draft of Proposed Sex Offender Law, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Sept. 28, 2005). 
152 Goodman, supra note 16. 
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residency restriction laws, individuals listed on state registries for 
engaging in consensual teenage sex will be forced to move to 
another area of the state or out of the state in which they reside.153 
If they do not relocate, they may face arrest or prosecution.154 For 
those individuals who are convicted for acts of consensual teenage 
sex and serve what is already a harsh sentence for their conviction, 
such additional punishment seems extremely harsh and 
disproportionate to the crime.155 
Another consequence of registration for these individuals is that 
they “find themselves subject to the shame and stigma of being 
identified as sex offenders on online registries, in some cases for the 
rest of their lives.”156 As a result of the label and the requirement to 
register as a sex offender, many of these individuals experience 
“despair and hopelessness”157 and some have even committed 
suicide.158 They are often ostracized from their communities.159 
Sometimes, individuals or communities resort to vigilante 
violence against those who are registered sex offenders, even if they 
are on the registries for acts of consensual teenage sex.160 
Registrants reported a range of vigilantism to authorities, including 
“having glass bottles thrown through their windows, being . . . 
physically assaulted while the assailants yelled ‘You like little 
children, right?’, . . . people repeatedly ringing the doorbell and 
pounding on the sides of the house late at night,” and threats of 
                                                           
153 McDonald, supra note 57. 
154 Id. 
155 See Downey, supra note 52 (“The registry is a prison sentence in its 
own right.”); see also Alex B. Eyssen, Does Community Notification for Sex 
Offenders Violate the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition Against Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment? A Focus on Vigilantism Resulting from “Megan’s Law,” 
33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 101, 135 (2001) (“Thorough analysis of community 
notification laws . . . demonstrate that such programs are indeed punishment, 
regardless of any supposed regulatory intent.”). 
156 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 66. 
157 Id. at 78 (citing Jill Levenson & Leo Cotter, The Effects of Megan’s 
Law on Sex Offender Reintegration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 298–300 
(2005)). 
158 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 78–79. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 87–88. 
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imminent death.161 Some vigilantism has been extreme. For 
example, individuals listed on sex offender registries have been 
killed because their information was accessed on the Internet.162 
Many registered sex offenders “have been targets of violence 
from strangers who take it upon themselves to ‘eliminate’ sex 
offenders from communities.”163 In New Hampshire, Lawrence 
Trant set fire to the homes of several registered sex offenders and 
stabbed another registrant outside of his home.164 Donald Keegan 
was arrested in New York for plotting to blow up a home where 
four convicted sex offenders were living.165 In Bellingham, 
Washington, Anthony Mullen killed two convicted sex offenders 
he found on the state’s online registry.166 Mullen posed as an FBI 
agent to enter the victims’ homes, “under the guise of warning them 
that they were on a ‘hit list’ on the internet.”167 Once inside, he 
then shot both of them in the head.168 
Only fourteen states and the District of Columbia have statutes 
that “specifically prohibit the misuse of registry information for 
purposes of harassment, discrimination, or acts of vigilantism.”169 
                                                           
161 Id. 
162 Jeff Tuttle, Vigilante Understands Marshall, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, 
May 20, 2006, at 1. For example, in 2006, a 20-year-old Canadian man with a 
list of 29 names and addresses from the Maine Sex Offender Registry went to the 
homes of two convicted sex offenders, shooting and killing both of them. Id. 
Both of the men were strangers to the killer, Stephen Marshall. He found their 
names on the state’s website. One of the men was on the website because he was 
convicted for statutory rape for having sex with his girlfriend two weeks before 
her sixteenth birthday when he was nineteen. Jones, supra note 130. 
163 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 89. 
164 Tuttle, supra note 162. 
165 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 89. 
166 Tuttle, supra note 162. 
167 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 89. 
168 Tuttle, supra note 162. 
169 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 90. States with 
prohibitions include: California, CAL. PENAL CODE §290.4(c) (2008); 
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. §54-258a (2008); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §18-
8326 (2008); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. §846E-3(g) (2007); Kentucky, KY. 
REV. STAT. §17.580(3) (2007); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch.6, 
§178N (2008); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. §45-33-51 (2007); New Jersey, 
N.J. STAT. §2C:7-16(b) (2007); New York, NY CORRECT. LAW §168-q(2) 
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The Adam Walsh Act has a provision that requires states to 
include a “warning that information should not be used to 
unlawfully injure, harass, or commit a crime against any individual 
named in the registry or residing or working at any reported 
address.”170 However, it does not require that states specifically 
prohibit the misuse of the information and make it illegal.171 Since 
there is nothing that specifically prohibits people from harassing 
and attacking individuals on the sex offender registries, individuals 
whose names appear on the registries for engaging in consensual 
teenage sex may easily become targets.172 
III. STATUTORY RAPE LAWS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”173 The 
amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment,174 and it affirms the rights of individuals not to be 
subject to excessive punishments.175 This right derives from the 
idea that punishment for a crime should be proportional to the 
offense.176 Punishment is considered cruel and unusual if it 
“subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and 
                                                           
(2008); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §9798.1(b)(2); South 
Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §23-3-510 (2007); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §77-27-
21.5(22) (2007); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, §5411a(h) (2008); 
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §9.1- 919 (2008); and Washington D.C., D.C. 
CODE §22-4011(d) (2008). HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 90, 
n.308. 
170 42 U.S.C.A. § 16918 (West 2007). 
171 Id. (“The warning shall note that any such action could result in civil or 
criminal penalties.”) (emphasis added). 
172 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 93 (noting that community 
members have used notification information to keep registered sex offenders from 
moving into their neighborhoods and pushing them to leave if they already live 
there). 
173 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
174 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam). 
175 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). 
176 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). 
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distress.”177 However, the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
words of the amendment “are not precise, and that their scope is 
not static. Thus, the Amendment must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”178 
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, a plurality of the Court held that 
execution of any offender under the age of sixteen at the time of the 
crime is unconstitutional.179 Significantly, the Court stressed that 
“[t]he reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and 
responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible 
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”180 
Throughout all of the cases regarding cruel and unusual 
punishment, the Supreme Court has looked to the number of states 
that reject certain punishments to determine whether there is a 
national consensus.181 “Objective indicia” of society’s standards 
may be found in legislative enactments and state practice.182 With 
respect to finding a national consensus, “[i]t is not so much the 
number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of 
the direction of change.”183 A majority of states have either 
decriminalized consensual teenage sex or reduced the crime to a 
                                                           
177 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (“He knows not what 
discriminations may be established against him, what proscriptions may be 
directed against him.”). 
178 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
179 487 U.S. 815, 818–38 (1988). 
180 Id. at 835. 
181 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (concluding that 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did not proscribe the execution of 
juvenile offenders over fifteen but under eighteen when 22 of the 37 death penalty 
states permitted the death penalty for sixteen-year-old offenders and 25 of the 37 
states permitted the death penalty for seventeen-year-old offenders); Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment did not 
mandate a categorical exemption from the death penalty for the mentally retarded 
because only two states had enacted laws on the subject); Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of the mentally retarded is cruel 
and unusual punishment after finding that only a minority of states permitted the 
practice). 
182 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005). 
183 Id. at 565 (citing Penry, 492 U.S. at 315). 
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misdemeanor.184 Thus, the states are moving toward reducing the 
punishment for such acts.185 
As noted in Roper v. Simmons, there is “sufficient evidence 
that today our society views juveniles, . . . as ‘categorically less 
culpable than the average criminal.’”186 Recently, the Supreme 
Court articulated that the Eighth Amendment “contains a ‘narrow 
proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital 
sentences.’”187 Therefore, the punishment meted out to juveniles 
should not be as harsh as those given to adults who are more 
culpable, especially to adults who prey on children. 
The Supreme Court maintains that deference should be paid to 
state legislatures in determining punishments.188 States may impose 
sentences with a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, 
deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.189 However, punishments 
imposed by certain states for acts of consensual teenage sex are too 
harsh to serve any of those justifications. “[W]hile torture, drawing 
and quartering, public dissecting, burning alive and disemboweling 
have since been ruled by courts to be prohibited, in the area of 
sexual conduct, punishments that most would consider cruel and 
unusual continue to be supported by state legislators.”190 
The current statutory rape laws in Kansas,191 
                                                           
184 See Olzsweski, supra note 59, at 706–07. 
185 See Age of Consent Chart for the US—2008, supra note 54; see also 
John Gramlich, States Revising Penalties for Young ‘Romeos’, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, July 22, 2007, at A6. 
186 534 U.S. at 567 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316). 
187 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (citing Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996–97 (1991) (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment)). 
188 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25. 
189 Id. (citing 1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
§1.5, at 30–36 (1986)). 
190 Brickner, supra note 18. 
191 “Aggravated indecent liberties with a child is: (1) sexual intercourse 
with who is more than 14 years of age but less than 16 years of age . . . 
Aggravated indecent liberties with a child . . . is a severity level 3, person 
felony.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3504 (2007). 
Unlawful voluntary sexual relations is engaging in voluntary: (1) 
Sexual intercourse; (2) sodomy; or (3) lewd fondling or touching with a 
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Massachusetts,192 Michigan,193 South Carolina,194 and Wisconsin195 
                                                           
child who is 14 years of age but less than 16 years of age and the 
offender is less than 19 years of age and less than four years of age older 
than the child and the child and the offender are the only parties 
involved and are members of the opposite sex. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522 (2007). Unlawful voluntary sexual relations is a 
felony. § 21-3522; see also 2007 KANSAS LAWS CH. 183 (amending the 2006 
laws providing requirements for sex offender registration). 
192 MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 265, § 23 (2007) (“Whoever unlawfully has 
sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse, and abuses a child under 
sixteen years of age shall, for the first offense, be punished by imprisonment in 
the state prison for life or for any term of years, or, except as otherwise provided, 
for any term in a jail or house of correction, and for the second or subsequent 
offense by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years, but 
not less than five years; provided, however, that a prosecution commenced under 
the provisions of this section shall not be placed on file or continued without a 
finding.”); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 4 (2007) (“Whoever induces 
any person under 18 years of age of chaste life to have unlawful sexual 
intercourse shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more 
than three years or in a jail or house of correction for not more than two and one-
half years or by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by both such fine and 
imprisonment.”); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6 §§ 178C-Q (2007) 
(providing requirements for sex offender registration). 
193 “A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree if the 
person engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the 
following circumstances exist: (a) That other person is at least 13 years of age 
and under 16 years of age.” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520d (West 2007). 
Criminal Sexual conduct in the third degree is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than 15 years. Id. In addition, “Any man who shall 
seduce and debauch any unmarried woman shall be guilty of a felony, punishable 
by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 5 years.” MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 750.532 (West 2007); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. 
28.722 (West 2007) (providing requirements for sex offender registration). 
194 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-140 (2007) (“It is unlawful for a person over 
the age of fourteen years to willfully and lewdly commit or attempt a lewd or 
lascivious act upon or with the body, or its parts, of a child under the age of 
sixteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or 
passions or sexual desires of the person or of the child. A person violating the 
provisions of this section is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be 
fined in the discretion of the court or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or 
both.”). “A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree if 
the actor engages in sexual battery with a victim who is at least fourteen years of 
age but who is less than sixteen years of age and . . . is older than the victim.” 
M. COHEN AUTHORIZED 2.DOC  
748 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment because the statutes punish consensual teenage sex as 
felonies, impose lengthy prison sentences, and require convicted 
individuals to register as sex offenders. The large number of states 
that have revised their laws to include age-gap provisions and to 
decriminalize consensual teenage sexual acts shows a national 
consensus that punishing these acts as a felony with required sex 
offender registration is cruel and unusual punishment.196 In 
addition, the international community has recognized that many 
laws created cruel and unusual punishments for engaging in 
consensual teenage sex.197 Not only is the original punishment of 
jail time or probation disproportionate to the crime of consensual 
teenage sex, but these states also have laws that require these 
individuals to register as sex offenders upon release.198 
                                                           
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(3) (2007); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430 
(2007) (providing requirements for sex offender registration). 
195 “Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who 
has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony.” WIS. STAT. 
ANN. §948.02 (West 2007). See also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.45 (West 2007) 
(providing requirements for sex offender registration). 
196 Currently, 47 states include age-gap provisions, but amongst those 
states with such provisions, some states still make consensual teenage sex a 
crime, albeit less of a crime. See Age of Consent Chart for the US—2008, supra 
note 54. 
197 In June of 2007, the Congress of Peru reformed the statutory rape laws to 
declare that having consensual sexual relations with a person fourteen years old 
or older is legal. Statutory Rape Law Reformed in Peru, LIVINGINPERU.COM, 
http://www.livinginperu.com/news-4116-politics-statutory-rape-law-reformed-
peru (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). Before this reform, a person could be charged 
with statutory rape and be sentenced to up to thirty years in prison for having 
sexual relations with a person under the age of sixteen. Id. In Canada, “the 
Criminal Code provides that any person who, for sexual purposes, touches any 
part of the body of a person under the age of 14 is guilty of the offense of sexual 
interference . . . . However, if the accused person is between the ages of 12 and 
16 and the victim is less than two years younger than the accused and consented 
to the activity, it is not considered a crime.” Susan A. Herman, Rape Law, 
Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2007, http://encarta.msn.com/text_ 
761564013___2/Rape_(law).html (last visited Mar. 12, 2008). 
198 See 2007 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 183 (amending the 2006 laws providing 
requirements for sex offender registration); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6 §§ 178C-Q 
(2007) (providing requirements for sex offender registration); MICH. COMP. 
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The registration laws “subject[] the individual to a fate of ever-
increasing fear and distress.”199 As discussed earlier, registration 
laws not only subject individuals to ostracism and depression, but 
also to vigilante violence—all are additional forms of 
punishment.200 In addition, states that refuse to apply their new 
laws retroactively also violate the Eighth Amendment since 
individuals convicted before the laws are amended will have to 
serve their sentences and then suffer an additional punishment by 
being forced to register upon release.201 However, if states consider 
necessary reforms, the laws can conform to the requirements of the 
Eighth Amendment. 
IV. NECESSARY REFORMS 
A.  Apply New Laws Retroactively 
Some states modified their laws to reflect the view that 
adolescent consensual sex is not a serious crime and should not be 
punished as a felony with extensive sentences and forced 
registration requirements.202 However, the new laws leave many 
                                                           
LAWS. ANN. §28.722 (West 2007) (providing requirements for sex offender 
registration); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430 (2007) (providing requirements for 
sex offender registration); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.45 (West 2007) (providing 
requirements for sex offender registration). 
199 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (internal citations omitted). 
200 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121, at 79, 87–88. See also 
Carpenter, supra note 143, at 369–70. 
201 See Downey, supra note 52 (writing that in Georgia, the Legislature 
changed the statutory rape law so that consensual teenage sex is only a 
misdemeanor, but “the Legislature did nothing to help the teenagers tripped up 
by the old law.”). 
202 See Gramlich, supra note 185.  A new law in Florida allows teenagers 
involved in consensual sexual activity with no more than four years between 
them to petition to have their names removed from both state and national sex 
offender registries. Id. In Indiana, lawmakers changed the law to decriminalize 
consensual sex between adolescents if a court determines they are in a “dating 
relationship” and are within four years of age. Id. In Georgia, H.B. 1059, enacted 
in 2006, reduces the classification of statutory rape from a felony to a 
misdemeanor by including an age-gap provision. 2006 Ga. Laws 571. 
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individuals who were previously convicted without any remedy.203 
Therefore, it is important to apply the new laws retroactively. If 
the laws are not applied retroactively, many individuals who were 
convicted for engaging in consensual teenage sex will still be subject 
to punishment that is disproportionate to the crime. 
In its report on sex offender registration, Human Rights Watch 
makes some appropriate suggestions.204 The report recommends 
that “[s]tates should institute mechanisms by which offenders are 
removed from registries if they are exonerated; their convictions 
have been overturned, set aside, or otherwise vitiated; or if their 
conduct is no longer considered criminal.”205 As for residency 
restrictions, the report proposes that the laws should not apply to 
entire classes of former offenders.206 In Georgia, the Attorney 
General has argued that the law changing consensual teenage sex to 
a misdemeanor with no registration requirement cannot be applied 
retroactively, but that the retroactive residency restrictions are 
legal.207 If laws regarding residency restrictions for sex offenders 
may be applied retroactively, it is only fair that the laws 
concerning their convictions and sentences should also have 
retroactive application. 
B. Change the Laws to Make Explicit Distinctions Between 
Sexual Predators and Adolescents Engaging in 
Consensual Sex 
One of the most feasible and appropriate potential reforms of 
statutory rape laws is for states to differentiate between dangerous 
offenders and adolescents engaging in consensual acts. Such 
distinctions are important because “[a] teenager could have a 
                                                           
203 See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 5. Since the Georgia legislature refused 
to apply its new statutory rape laws retroactively, Genarlow Wilson spent over 
two years in prison until the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that his sentence 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment and released him on October 26, 
2007. Id. 
204 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 121. 
205 Id. at 15–16. 
206 Id. at 19. 
207 McDonald, supra note 57. 
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lifetime of hell because of a misplaced tag [as a sex offender]. On 
the other hand, society could have a hellish situation if we don’t 
identify the right people.”208 The right people to be identified are 
sexual predators who prey on young children instead of teenagers 
engaging in consensual sex with their classmates.209 
This year, laws enacted “in Connecticut, Florida, Indiana and 
Texas, along with a bill waiting for the governor’s approval in 
Illinois, try to draw clearer distinctions between sexual predators 
and adolescents who pose less of a risk, such as those caught in so-
called ‘Romeo and Juliet’ relationships.”210 These state policies 
“take different approaches but share a goal of preventing low-risk 
adolescents from facing the same penalties as serious predators.”211 
Florida’s new policy permits individuals to petition to have 
their names removed from state and national sex offender registries 
if they engaged in consensual sexual acts with a person no more 
than four years younger than them.212 This law is similar to the law 
proposed by Laurie Peterson in New Hampshire and defeated by 
legislators in the Senate. The Illinois bill would ensure that juvenile 
sex offenders are not added to the state’s adult registry.”213 In 
Indiana, the law calls for the courts to take a more involved and 
detailed approach in each case because the law “decriminalizes 
consensual sex between adolescents if they are found by a court to 
be in a ‘dating relationship’ with an age difference of four years or 
less.”214 Under that law, “[c]ourts will also have discretion to 
determine whether violators should be included in the state’s sex 
                                                           
208 Gramlich, supra note 185 (internal citation omitted). 
209 Koch, supra note 21 (quoting Oklahoma state Rep. Gus Blackwell as 
saying, “[w]e’re trying to get pedophiles, not teenagers in a consensual 
relationship.”). 
210 Gramlich, supra note 185 (in Connecticut, lawmakers widened the age 
gap from two years to three, and Texas revamped its risk-assessment system that 
previously allowed some teenagers who had consensual sex with a younger 
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offender registry.”215 These reforms allow states to use their 
statutory rape laws to catch sexual predators without leaving a 
permanent taint on the lives of adolescents who engage in 
consensual teenage sex, and therefore, all states should revise their 
laws similarly. 
In reforming the laws to create clear distinctions between sexual 
predators and teenagers, states should look to a new program that 
was adopted in Dane County, Wisconsin.216 The program 
considered the opinions of the community and the goals that are 
served by punishment. The Dane County State’s Attorney office 
began by looking into the community’s values and opinions on 
statutory rape cases.217 Members of an advisory group told 
prosecutors that first-time young offenders should be educated and 
efforts should be made to focus on prevention rather than mere 
punishment.218 The members of the community were worried that 
prosecutors were not distinguishing young statutory rape offenders 
from predatory rapists and child molesters.219 
As a result of their meetings and discussions with the 
community members, the prosecutors developed an “alternative 
disposition program for younger offenders.”220 An integral aspect 
of the program is that individuals convicted of statutory rape 
offenses may choose to attend a nine-week class in sex education in 
lieu of a prison sentence or probation.221 Significantly, if they 
successfully complete the course, their conviction will not become 
part of their criminal record.222 The program “reflects a balance 
between the law’s capacity to set an exceedingly harsh punishment 
for this crime, and the law’s obligation to take seriously the harm 
that it is designed to remedy.”223 
                                                           
215 Id. 
216 Oberman, supra note 45, at 773. 





222 Oberman, supra note 45, at 774. 
223 Id. 
  
 NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND BARS 753 
C.  Change the Laws on Sex Offender Registration 
In addition to changing the penalties for consensual teenage sex, 
states should also amend their sex offender registration laws so that 
the lists only include sexual predators. Currently, teenagers in 
many states are subjected to sex offender laws “for conduct that, 
while frowned upon, does not suggest a danger to the community, 
including consensual sex.”224 Teresa Younger, executive director of 
the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, argues that the public should 
only receive information that they need to know, and that a list of 
names and addresses and pictures does not necessarily provide 
such information.225 The state should screen the information that 
goes on to the website because 
individuals listed are not just the dangerous scary rapists. 
This is a situation potentially of a 19-year-old who has 
consensual sex with a 15-year-old, then is prosecuted for 
statutory rape, serves nine months in jail, and is now a 
registered sex offender. That doesn’t help the citizens of 
Connecticut know if he is violent or not violent.226 
States should model sex offender registration laws after the 
laws enacted in Minnesota, which provide for community 
notification only on a need-to-know basis.227 The law states that 
“[t]he extent of the information disclosed and the community to 
whom disclosure is made must be related to the level of danger 
posed by the offender . . . and to the need of community members 
for information to enhance their individual and collective safety.”228 
Public safety will still be protected if states utilize community 
notification on a need-to-know basis.229 
Sex offender registries are intended to make the public aware of 
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sexual predators, not teenagers who engage in adolescent sex.230 
Unfortunately, as many child safety and rape prevention advocates 
believe, states are pouring money into “registration and community 
notification programs that do not deal with the real causes of sexual 
abuse and violence.”231 Unlimited online access to registry 
information encourages people to ostracize former offenders, 
making it less likely that they will be able to reintegrate into 
communities.232 This community response “subjects the individual 
to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress,” and is therefore cruel 
and unusual punishment.233 
In order to address some of these problems, states should 
reform their laws regarding sex offender registries. Offenders who 
have committed minor, non-violent offenses, such as consensual 
teenage sexual activity, should not be required to register.234 If 
individuals have previously been required to register, states should 
remove them from the registry if they are exonerated, if their 
convictions are overturned or set aside, or if their conduct is no 
longer considered criminal.235 If individuals convicted of a crime for 
engaging in consensual teenage sex are not required to register, they 
will not be subject to additionally harsh punishment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Consensual teenage sex should not be criminalized because, in 
contrast to what many proponents of statutory rape laws argue, 
adolescent sexual activity may be beneficial to teenagers.236 
However, if states insist on regulating such acts, they must craft 
the laws so that they do not subject teenagers to cruel and unusual 
punishment for their actions. Currently, the laws of at least five 
states appear to subject teenagers to cruel and unusual punishment 
because the statutes carry a felony conviction with a prison 
sentence. While it might be argued that a prison sentence alone 
cannot constitute cruel and unusual punishment, a conviction for 
statutory rape, child molestation, or sexual assault carries an 
additional component. The convictions often require these 
teenagers to register as sex offenders for a period of years or for the 
rest of their lives, thus subjecting them to further punishment. 
States must change their laws in order to protect teenagers from 
receiving harsh punishments such as jail sentences for engaging in 
consensual sex. 
These states should follow suit with other states that have 
revised the laws in order to completely decriminalize such acts or 
to classify consensual teenage sex as a misdemeanor with less 
severe punishment. Subjecting teenagers to such punishment 
simply because legislators believe that teenage sex is immoral is not 
justified by any theory of punishment. “Although juvenile sexual 
conduct is not to be encouraged, the current prohibitions and 
punishments are unnecessarily harsh and overreaching and fail to 
take into account contemporary reality.”237 
Revising the laws does not necessarily mean that the states will 
be condoning sex between teenagers. Instead, the states will be 
using the laws to prosecute the true targets of the laws—sexual 
predators. States that have revised their laws to provide for lesser 
penalties should apply the new laws retroactively so individuals 
who were convicted under old laws are not subject to registration 
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requirements and residency restrictions.238 Those states that have 
not yet revised their laws should change the laws to make explicit 
distinctions between sexual predators who pose a threat to children 
and adolescents engaging in consensual sex.239 In addition, states 
should change their laws on sex offender registration to guarantee 
that adolescents who engaged in consensual teenage sex are not 
included and therefore not subject to lifelong stigma and vigilante 
violence.240 It is imperative that states employ these reforms so 
they can eliminate injustice and ensure that their laws do not 
violate the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
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